Police Surveillance: Two First Hand Views

It was fascinating to read about my undeserved significance to the D. C. Police Department in the February 15th edition of The Washington Post. Some subsequent observations:

• Friends have quietly compared their superior contributions to civil rights, anti-war issues, abortion reform and ERA support to mine. Alas, most are correct and all I can do is apologize. I am sorry I was surveilled and these wonderful people were not. Life is never fair.

• I would like to think we (the women's movement) were important enough to warrant real undercover agents. Unfortunately, I am forced to believe that it was my husband and not me or the movement that was significant during 1969-72.

• Mentioning me, in the same article, with the undercover monitoring of Sargent Shriver has probably ruined my radical reputation, if I ever had one.

• Jim D. Binsted has guts, discussing with you his undercover work. However, his wife, Dorie, will not get my vote of confidence unless she insists on being fully paid for finding out "what she (Mrs. Hobson) says and who she hangs around with and what does she think." Anyone with that assignment should have been paid double-time to compensate for boredom. I would be happy to help in her case.

• This incident is only funny in its stupidity. With home rule, D.C. citizens now must learn the relationship of our Police Department to the Justice Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency and the White House. Some standards have to be established and understood to control police surveillance of non-criminal activities. It is up to everyone to work toward this goal.

Tina Hobson.

Washington.

In response to ex-chief Wilson's column (Post, February 21) regarding police intelligence and political leaders, I would enjoy voicing some overlooked matters and also give a personal opinion.

Being a four year veteran of the city's police department (now resigned) and an ex-intelligence officer during that period, I saw first-hand the surveillance activities conducted on political groups and individuals. The chief's column attempts to stymie and rationalize public concern by contending that *everyone* should know by now that spying on public figures was common, and it should not come as a surprise.

Then comes the justification for its necessity. Granted, groups whose philosophy was based on violence, as were the BUF, Yippies and others, needed close monitoring. Granted, at large rallies and demonstrations, intelligence operations were needed for crowd control and movement. And granted, we all know that organized crime needs monitoring. Unfortunately, the column evades and does not justify the case at hand: political surveillance.

Since when is the incumbent political party and its leadership seen lawful to influence, manipulate and use a non-partisan law enforcement intelligence agency? Why should there be political surveillance against groups or persons who may differ in political or economic philosophy yet present no physical threat to anyone?

Is it proper to secretly keep intelligence records on social reformers alongside records of Cosa Nostra figures? Can we consider Julius Hobson and his wife un-American desperadoes while the opulent Bebe Rebozo is epitomized as a patriot?

The local political espionage can be considered just a small missing piece of the mammoth Nixon spy puzzle. A puzzle which is slowly being pieced together (Watergate, FBI, CIA, etc.) and our small piece logically fits in place. The pity is to see Chief Wilson attempt to bury our piece to save face for both himself and the department who were unwittingly used as a political tool.

James D. Binsted.

Cabin John, Md.

Council Asks Specific Data On D.C. Police Surveillance

By Linda Newton Jones
Washington Post Staff Writer

The D.C. City Council yesterday sent to Mayor Walter E. Washington a list of questions it would like answered in the forthcoming report on the intelligence-gathering activities of the D.C. police department.

Included among the questions was one about the estimated total cost of the intelligence program and another on the degree of control department officials have over the activities of individual officers in order to prevent illegal investigations.

The Council asked that it receive copies of the department's report no later than the first week in March. Members said the report would provide the basis for a possible Council investigation into intelligence activities of the department.

D.C. Police Chief Maurice Cullinane ordered the internal investigation into the activities of the department's intelligence division last week after it was reported that city police maintained files on the personal lives of antiwar activists and some local politicians.

At-large City Councilman Julius Hobson, who was reported to have been included in the police files, led the Council in its move to obtain the information.

Hobson told the Council at its committee-of-the-whole meeting yesterday that he planned to ask the mayor for a copy of the report and for the additional information on the department. The Council endorsed Hobson's move and all members except Chairman Sterling Tucker signed a memorandum he delivered to the mayor.

Tucker told the Council that he had already conferred with the mayor concerning the report and did not feel he should petition him for the information. He said he already has "the assurances of the mayor" that the Council will receive the information.

Ward One Councilman David A. Clarke said he believes he was under surveillance by the police in 1971 when a woman, who was later revealed to be a police officer, oined a group he headed at hat time, the D. C. Freedom and Independence Day Committee.

He said Ward Seven Council member Willie Hardy also was on the committee.

Recent reports of the intelligence activities of the department revealed that at-large Councilman Marion Barry and D.C. Del. Walter Fauntroy ere included in police files.

Council members said in the memo that they are confident the mayor would support their quest for additional information since "we are sure the citizens of the District would feel more comfortable with an ndependent review of the acts by the elected City Council."

The Council asked that the eport also include a complete ist of all persons named in special noncriminal files and a list of persons who were subected to other forms of surveillance for noncriminal reasons. Members also want to know who authorized the surveillances, who ordered the destruction of the files, and whether the information was ised by other government gencies.

JULIUS HOBSON SR.
. . . supported by Council

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Witnesses Say Police Agents Used Disruptive Tactics

By Paul W. Valentine
Washington Post Staff Writer

A former undercover policeman and an antiwar leader told a D.C. City Council committee yesterday that police operatives used disruptive and violence-provoking tactics in street demonstrations and antiwar meetings in the early 1970s.

Rich Pollock, an unemployed freelance journalist and close associate of antiwar leader Rennie Davis in the May Day organization, testified he observed undercover D.C. police informant Anne Kolego Markowich urging demonstrators to take violent action.

James Binsted, 33, a former D.C. intelligence officer, also testified that police superiors "told us to disrupt."

Police officials denied Binsted's claims and Mrs. Markowich could not be reached for comment on Pollock's claims.

The testimony came in the second day of hearings by the Council's public safety committee into operations of the police department's intelligence division.

Six subpoenaed police officers refused to appear before the committee Thursday, and the Council formally asked the D.C. Superior Court to enforce subpoenas with contempt proceedings if necessary.

Superior Court Acting Chief Judge William S. Thompson set a hearing in the matter for Sept. 3, following the Council's month-long recess in August.

Other police officers continued yesterday to defy the Council committee's attempts to have the police tell of their undercover work and surveillance activities.

One officer refused to name the organization in which she had planted informants.

Another officer, who acknowledged the Black Panther Party and the "Black United Front" were infiltrated here, would not specify if the informants were black or white when instructed by committee chairwoman Willie Hardy (D-seven).

Earlier, Pollock of the May Day organization testified that Mrs. Markowich encouraged demonstrators without success to jump the fence at the White House during a civil disobedience protest in October, 1971, unsuccessfully urged a group marching on the Pentagon to detonate a bomb in the building in April, 1972, and shouted encouragement to demonstrators throwing rocks and bottles at police during a mass rally at the Capitol in October 1971.

Known in antiwar circles as "Crazy Annie" because of her high strung personality, Mrs. Markowich was a familiar figure in the administrative offices of many antiwar organizations.

Binsted described numerous instances in which he said he was asked by his superiors to disrupt antiwar activity.

For example, he said, "My partner was a yippie (a member of the Youth International Party). He was loud and rhetorical, and I would come in and try to break up meetings . . . get into fights, that kind of thing."

"Were you given instructions by the intelligence division on how to break up meetings?" asked Mrs. Hardy.

"No, I grew up at 14th and Park Road (NW)," answered the long-haired Binsted. "I don't need any instructions on how to disorganize anything."

Binsted outlined to Council members several other undercover escapades reported in the press earlier this year when he "surfaced" and met with reporters.

Police officials have repeatedly said all officers and paid informants were under specific instructions not to disrupt or incite violence while monitoring groups.

Earlier yesterday, two police officers described general surveillance operations against antiwar and civil rights groups but refused to be specific about their informants.

With an attorney at her side, Sgt. Dixie Gildon said disclosure of infiltrated organizations could lead to identification of her sources and "put them in jeopardy" including physical harm.

Her attorney, Leonard Burka, also contended that questions about informant identity were beyond the scope of the hearings, called to examine only the "regulatory framework" of the intelligence division.

"There is no legislative purpose in disclosing the names," he argued.

Committee member David Clarke

See POLICE, B2, Col. 1

Arlington Police Pick Teamsters

By Athelia Knight
Washington Post Staff Writer

Arlington County police officers yesterday elected the Teamsters union, which has been successful in winning bargaining rights and higher pay for Fairfax County police, as their official bargaining agent.

The Teamsters received 54.9 per cent of the unofficial votes, compared with 35.7 per cent for the Arlington County Police Beneficiary Association, the local body which formerly represented the police officers, and 7.5 per cent for the International Brotherhood of Police Officers. Slightly less than 2 per cent of the 213 non-supervisory police officers who voted in the election chose none of the three.

"I think it is obvious that the men want professional representation," said Arlington Det. Stephen W. Behrens after the election results had been announced.

Behrens said the non-supervisory officers were dissatisfied with the Arlington Police Beneficiary Association, although it negotiated a 7.5 per cent pay and benefits boost, this year, according to association officials. The association is headed by a sergeant who holds a supervisory position in the department and the role of supervisors in police bargaining units was an issue in the election.

"We have tried as hard as we can," said Officer Geff Steger, vice president of the association. Steger said the issue of whether or not to join the Teamsters had caused a split in the police department.

"I hope the officers can get together now," Steger said.

Since it began representing Fairfax County police in 1973, the Teamsters Local 246 has negotiated two contracts that have boosted pay and benefits by 28.4 per cent, according to Officer Peter Bonavita, president of the Fairfax County Police Association.

The record of the Teamsters in Fairfax was influential in the Arlington election, Behrens said.

There are 308 members of the Arlington police force, but only the 240 non-supervisory personnel—of whom 213 cast votes—were eligible to join the union. County Board policy bans supervisory personnel from membership in unions.

Det. Edmond A. Faulconer said that among benefits the union will seek in next year's contract will be fair standards for promotions, a reduction of the time it takes to reach maximum salary, improved trial board procedures and premium pay for court appearances.

County Board member Everard Munsey said he does not think there is much difference between the Beneficiary Association and the Teamsters. "We have had vigorous bargaining from their formal bargaining agent, and I expect we will have vigorous bargaining in the future," he said.

The Teamsters now officially represent two large area police departments. Other police departments and their representatives are: District of Columbia, International Brotherhood of Police officers; and Prince George's County, Lodge Fraternal Order of Police. Montgomery County is not represented by a union, a police spokesman said.

District police in combat gear assemble near Fitch Place home of the gunman.

Mother and Son Shot Dead, Gunman Ends Life in Siege

By Stephen J. Lynton and Alfred E. Lewis
Washington Post Staff Writers

A man whose family had tried futilely to have him committed to St. Elizabeths Hospital killed his mother and mentally-retarded stepbrother in their Northeast Washington home yesterday morning and then shot himself to death after being tear-gassed by police.

According to several sources and records at St. Elizabeths, the family had feared the man, William Ronald Watts, 20, and tried in vain to have him admitted as a mental patient.

"This is an irony of our social system," Doris Rudder, a public school teacher and friend of the family, said.

The shootings occurred as Watts took over his family's home at 4919 Fitch Pl. NE and held out against policemen for almost two hours. Police fired tear gas into the two-story brick home before the siege ended. Three of the dead woman's children escaped unharmed, one by jumping from a roof. They and other relatives remained in seclusion late yesterday.

From friends, associates, police accounts and public records, a picture emerged yesterday of a family living in relatively trying circumstances and considerable fear in a quiet neighborhood of single-family homes with neat front lawns near the city's eastern edge. The family occupies a semi-detached row house with steep front steps painted gray and green.

Watts' mother, Margerie J. Gilchrist, 41, was the first person killed yesterday, homicide detectives said. Mrs. Gilchrist, a clerk-typist for the D.C. human resources department, was found on the floor of her second-story bedroom with three or four bullet wounds in her head. The shots were fired at close range, the medical examiner's office said. She was still dressed in her nightgown.

Mrs. Gilchrist, who was described as quiet and cheerful, had lived in the house at least 17 years, according to neighbors, and had been married twice. Four of her children, including the gunman, were by her first husband from whom acquaintances believed she was divorced. Her second husband, Fories L. Gilchrist, a mechanic, died after a stroke last year,

See SHOOTING, B2, Col. 6

The body of William R. Watts is removed from his Northeast Washington home.

Photos by Gerald Martineau—The Washington Post

Tension is reflected by these persons who gathered at scene of shooting.

By Joseph P. Mastrangelo—The Washington Post

Map shows location of the residence in which three persons were shot dead.

Lorton Inmate Found Stabbed to Death; FBI Probing Case

By Paul Hodge
Washington Post Staff Writer

Tyrone Shuler, 22, an inmate at the Lorton Reformatory, was found stabbed to death in his dormitory bed early yesterday, according to D.C. corrections department officials.

Shuler, who was serving a 4-to-12-year sentence for armed burglary, was the third member of his family to die violently in the past nine years. He also was the fourth stabbing attack victim at Lorton this year. The other three inmates recovered.

Shuler's body, bearing several stab wounds in the chest and stomach, was found about 8 a.m. by guards who thought at first that he was still asleep. Corrections officials and members of Shuler's family, who received calls from several Lorton inmates later in the day, said there was no known motive for the slaying.

The investigation was joined by the FBI, since Lorton is a federal facility. Investigators said Shuler was one of 40 inmates in the dormitory in the medium security section of the prison.

"Tyrone was not a violent type, not a real criminal actor . . . and everybody liked him," Shuler's brother, James, said yesterday.

"And our family . . . there were 11 children and now they're only eight . . . we're just having a pretty bad run of luck. Tyrone's sister was stabbed to death nine years ago . . . and a couple of years before that she was cut up by a girl friend . . . had over 100 stiches . . . and then last year Tyrone's brother, Edward, hanged himself at D.C. General Hospital, where he was taken on a disorderly conduct charge," Shuler said.

Tyrone Shuler's only other arrest was for assaulting a police officer in 1971

See STAB, B2, Col. 7

Yeldell Backed on Firings

By LaBarbara Bowman
Washington Post Staff Writer

The city's human resources department will need at least $6.5 million more in its new budget to avert the firing of some employees, and that figure could go as high as $14 million, according to a report issued yesterday by the D.C. auditor.

That means that between 500 and 1,000 current employees would be fired unless the additional money is put in the department's budget, or unless the department can find a way to save the required amount by not filling vacancies and not buying supplies and equipment.

The D.C. City Council asked the auditor, who works for them, to do the audit on June 17 after DHR head Joseph P. Yeldell charged that some employees would have to be fired because of Council cuts in the department's budget for the 1976 fiscal year that began July 1.

The 18-page preliminary report that was delivered to the Council, the mayor and Yeldell late yesterday was prepared by auditor Matthew Watson and his staff. The auditor serves the Council as the General Accounting Office serves the Congress. This is his first report.

Council members Douglas E. Moore and Marion Barry, chairmen of the budget and the finance and revenue committees, respectively, said June 16 that Yeldell was "lying" when he talked about reductions in force. Council Chairman Sterling Tucker and Polly Shackleton, chairman of the Council committee on DHR, said then that no firings would result because of Council action.

"I think the report substantiates the data we're trying to give the Council," Yeldell said. "I would hope they provide the additional revenue."

Chairman Tucker would not comment on the report, explaining he had not read it. Earlier in the afternoon, Tucker had sought to delay public release of the report until Tuesday. No reason was given for this action, or why he later changed his mind.

Barry said the Council based its cut on information supplied by the city's budget office. He maintained yesterday that if that information had been correct, no firings would have resulted.

Watson said the figures were incorrect because the Council was not told by DHR or the city budget office that:

- DHR had not saved $6.2 million last year when the mayor imposed a hiring freeze.
- DHR was going to lose $2.5 million in reimbursements from the federal government in fiscal 1976 because of congressional action mandating the federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare to curb its reimbursements to cities for social services.
- DHR received $3.2 million last year in federal reimbursable funds that paid peoples' salaries, which was a one-time grant, and therefore not available this year.

Lacking this data, the Council cut the DHR budget by $6.2 million, thinking if it was saved through attrition last year, the same thing could happen this year, Watson found, and in addition, cut $1.8 million in other areas. The department already was short $5.7 million because of a loss of federal funds.

"There was a failure to communicate relevant information so the Council based its action on figures that were not right," Watson said, criticizing the executive branch for not giving the Council all the information it needed.

DHR, the city's largest

See AUDIT, B2, Col. 4

Award Set In Norfolk S&L Case

By Laura A. Kiernan
Washington Post Staff Writer

A U.S. District Court jury in Alexandria yesterday awarded the receiver for the collapsed Norfolk Savings and Loan Corp. $1.1 million plus about $250,000 in interest in a suit the receiver filed against the Norfolk accounting firm of Burrus, Cootes and Burrus.

In his suit, Edwin R. MacKethan, the receiver, contended that the accounting firm helped the savings and loan defraud its depositors by failing to report its insolvency.

Norfolk Savings and Loan was closed in January, 1973, and it was later discovered that its liabilities exceeded its assets by more than $11 million.

Last week the savings and loan's 3,500 depositors began to receive checks for 55 per cent of the amount they had deposited. The money to pay them came from more than $6 million collected by MacKethan through lawsuits and out-of-court settlements related to the company's failure.

Following yesterday's verdict, District Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. took under consideration a motion by the accounting firm's attorneys that the $1.1 million plus interest be considered already paid because of previous awards in the other lawsuits.

The collapse of Norfolk Savings and Loan came after two of its officers, Leon C. Hall and Frank Fuller Warren, used depositors' money to make loans to themselves and to corporations they created. Both men are serving federal prison terms for their role in the collapse.

During four days of testimony in the trial of the latest suit, attorneys for the receiver argued that the accountants, who examined Norfolk's books in 1970 and 1971, knew of the loans to the officers but failed to include the information in their audit reports.

An accountant for Burrus, George Roberts, testified he learned of the officer-connected loans during his examination of the association's records and discussed the finding with a Burrus partner, but did not include the information in his report.

The accountants' attorneys argued that their clients were not obligated to report that information and the lack of reporting it had nothing to do with Norfolk's collapse.

Jail Haircut Damages Rejected

RICHMOND, July 25—The Fourth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals said that Fairfax County Sheriff James D. Swinson should not have to pay damages to a prisoner who was forced to submit to a haircut in Swinson's jail.

The Appeals Court unanimously upheld a 1974 decision by U.S. District Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr., who ordered an end to involuntary haircuts for prisoners awaiting trial but rejected a claim by a prisoner for $25,000 in damages.

The Appeals Court said it agreed with Bryan's finding that Swinson was acting in good faith under state jail regulations when he ordered the haircut and therefore should not have to pay damages.

Body of Woman Found by Police

The body of an unidentified woman was found by police yesterday in an apartment at 807 Green St., Alexandria, police reported.

The body was discovered at 12:04 p.m., according to a police spokesman. He said police have reported the cause of death as undetermined pending an autopsy.

By James A. Parcell—The Washington Post

RUMBLING ALONG—Four youngsters share the fun of a rumble seat ride on their parents' bikes on the C&O towpath near Carderock.

Man Who Ran Hair Clinic Gets 3 Months in Fraud

By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer

The former operator of a hair and scalp clinic here was sentenced yesterday by U.S. District Court Judge Thomas A Flannery to serve three months in jail for defrauding customers of up to $1,300.

The sentence brought a rare public outcry from federal prosecutors who said it was too lenient.

Virgil Ginyard, 30, of Philadelphia, had been convicted by a jury earlier this month of one count of wire fraud and nine counts of false pretenses and faced a maximum of 30 years in prison. Maryland Nance Jr., who was described by prosecutors as having a lesser role in the fraud scheme, was placed on probation.

Flannery's sentence followed a lengthy discourse by Assistant U.S. Attorney Garey G. Stark on other con schemes in which Ginyard allegedly had taken part but with which he was not charged.

Stark said Ginyard sold tickets to a Philadelphia concert that never was performed and sold raffle tickets on a $10,000 automobile which he won.

"Ginyard's sentence is totally inappropriate in light of the pattern of fraud perpetrated upon the citizens of the Washington metropolitan area and inadequate to deter Ginyard and others from similar conduct in the future," said Robert W. Ogren, director of the fraud division that handles white-collar crimes in the U.S. attorney's office.

U. S. Attorney Earl J. Silbert would not elaborate on that statement but said he supported Stark's request for a substantial prison term. Other prosecutors privately criticized the sentence, saying it would not deter other con artists.

In imposing the sentence, Flannery also described Ginyard as "somewhat of a con artist . . . You live by your wits, take advantage of persons less gifted than you" he said. Flannery was a prosecutor for 16 years, and was U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia for two years before becoming a judge in 1971.

Ginyard maintained he was innocent yesterday saying, "At no time did I plan to defraud anybody." According to evidence at trial, the two men posed as doctors specially trained in hair and scalp problems, at the National Hair and Scalp Clinic. They made extravagant promises to customers about the benefits of the hair and scalp treatments, and refused to refund their money.

Stark said yesterday that on at least one occasion other clinic employees saw Ginyard, who is 6-foot-2, beating up and threatening at gunpoint a 5-foot-2 customer who was asking for his money back.

Stark asked that Ginyard be ordered to serve his prison term pending an appeal, but Flannery refused and let Ginyard out on bond.

"We've had some pretty important cases in this courthouse in the past year and those defendants were out on appeal," Flannery said in obvious reference to Watergate cases here. "Why should this man be treated any differently?"

Pr. George's Reaches Pact With Unions

The Prince George's County government and three unions representing public works employees, road workers, inspectors, and other county employees have reached agreement on a new contract, averting a threatened strike, county officials said yesterday.

John Lally, an aide to County Executive Winfield M. Kelly Jr., declined to release details of the settlement, but said, "We did re-evaluate our position to reflect some of the equities involved."

Lally indicated the county gave the workers more than the two $300 bonuses the county had offered the union workers in the stalemated negotiations. The workers had asked for a 10 per cent wage increase, which would amount to more than $600 for most workers.

On Tuesday, about 400 workers disrupted a County Council meeting as Council members prepared to debate a Kelly-sponsored bill that would raise the salaries of five top county officials by between $1,400 and $3,600 yearly.

Lally said details of the settlement will be announced Monday.

Arrest at Schiphol

Agence France-Presse

AMSTERDAM, July 25 — Customs men at Amsterdam's Schiphol airport seized 175 pounds of hashish and arrested an airline steward, Victor Bertol, 31, on board a Philippines Air Lines plane, police said.

Audit Backs Yeldell on Firing Need

AUDIT, From B1

agency which combines the health and welfare departments, pays its approximately 10,000 employees from three sources of funds —money appropriated from Congress, federal grants, and a combination of city money and the reimbursable grant funds.

The department needs $119 million in fiscal 1976 to pay its 7,900 present employees who are paid from appropriated funds and the joint federal and city funds. But it only has $112.5 million—thus, the $6.5 million deficit.

But the $112.5 million includes about $10 million to pay new employees who will run new programs that DHR wants to begin. If this $10 million is used to hire new employees instead of to pay old ones, the deficit rises to $14 million, Watson said.

In addition, the auditor's report does not consider the amount of money needed to pay anticipated salary increases that are scheduled to be given city employees later this year. This could add an additional $10 million to the deficit.

To get the $6.5 million minimum, the report recommends a total hiring freeze in the department, a freeze on buying certain supplies and equipment, transferring some federal reimbursement money to personnel that has been earmarked for other purposes and to take $2.5 million out of a contingency fund to pay salaries.

Concrete Strike Talks Recessed

Negotiations conducted by the federal government's chief labor mediator between Washington area contractors and a union representing striking concrete truck drivers were recessed last night with no date set for resumption.

However, W. J. Usery Jr., national director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, said that issues had narrowed in the two days of talks between the concrete contractors and Teamsters local 639. He said he had asked both sides to consider their positions in the next few days and be prepared to return to negotiate an agreement.

The strike is one of a series that has delayed work on Metro lines and several other major construction projects here.

Life Sentence Is Given In Drug Sale Murder

By Megan Rosenfeld
Washington Post Staff Writer

Bobby A. Poole, 20, who pleaded guilty last month to murdering and robbing a Fairfax man during a drug sale last November, was given a life sentence yesterday on Fairfax County Circuit Court.

In addition, Poole, who was also charged with shooting a second man during the incident, was given two 20-year sentences that will run concurrently. He could become eligible for parole in 15 years. Poole's brother, George, is charged with the same offenses, murder, robbery and maiming in the same case, but has not yet been tried.

Poole changed an innocent plea to guilty at the start of the second day of his trial. He was charged with fatally shooting Donald S. Monsky and wounding David Pitt of Marshall, Va., after arranging to sell them four pounds of marijuana.

Pitt was found by police slumped against a tree; Monsky's body was found 17 hours later four miles away. George and Bobby Poole were later arrested in New York state and extradited to Fairfax.

At the time, police called it an "execution-style" murder

A 15-year-old girl who testified at the trial, said that she and another teen-age girl and the Poole brothers rode around in a van with the two prospective buyers looking for "some place to deal with Donny." She testified that "the plan was to rip them off." Both girls were listed as runaways at the time.

Pitt, who was shot in the arm and back, said in court he wasn't sure which Poole brother killed Monsky. He testified that both he and Monsky were shot in the van, that Monsky was then taken out of the van and shot again, and that he (Pitt) was then searched for money, covered with a blanket and left in a ditch. About $900 was stolen from him, Pitt said.

TV Ad Suit Dismissed in Md. Court

Associated Press

A suit filed against Maryland Gov. Marvin Mandel and his campaign committee, charging invasion of privacy because of the filming of a television advertisement, was dismissed yesterday by Circuit Court Judge William Bowie in Prince George's County.

The suit, filed by B. Diane Berger on behalf of her daughter, Monica, asked for $4.75 million because of films taken of the girl when she was being put into a state Medevac helicopter after being injured in an automobile accident.

A crew making the commercial for Mandel's re-election campaign took films for use in an advertisement touting the Medevac program as an outstanding accomplishment of the Mandel administration.

The advertisement was telecast without the permission of the Bergers, but was quickly taken off the air after Mrs. Berger's complaints were made known.

Bowie dismissed the suit against Mandel, his campaign committee, a state trooper at the scene and the governor's advertising agency.

He did not act on the fifth defendant, Varied Directions, the firm that made the advertisement, because of the late date of service of papers. He said he would rule in the case of Varied Directions as soon as the appropriate proceedings were filled.

Bowie accepted the arguments of Mandel's lawyer that the accident was a public event open for filming.

Bowie said there was no invasion of privacy because there was no attempt to use the girl's identity, that she was not exploited by the advertisement and that any accident would have provided the necessary background scenes for the ad.

Emergency Rent Bill Is Signed by Mayor

By LaBarbara Bowman
Washington Post Staff Writer

Mayor Walter E. Washington, as expected, signed the new emergency rent control bill yesterday that could result in rent increases for some city tenants in 90 days.

Some city landlords have said the emergency bill is illegal since it retains for 60 days the present law, which has been struck down by the D.C. Court of Appeals.

The mayor also has signed the city's new revenue package, which includes various tax increases but removes the sales tax on food and drugs. This tax package will partially finance the city's new budget.

The emergency rent control bill went into effect immediately after the mayor signed it and will exist for 90 days. It does not require congressional review.

For the first 60 days the city will continue under the present rent control law so the rent commission can dispose of all its old cases.

During the next 30 days, the rent control provision to allow landlords earning less than 8 per cent return on their investment to raise rents up to 5 per cent goes into effect.

Before a landlord can raise rents, he must register his building with the rent commission and give tenants 30-day notices.

Tenants can ask for an audit of a landlord's books to ensure his rate of return is under 8 per cent but the tenant must pay the increased rent, which is placed in an interest-bearing escrow account until the audit has been completed.

Next week the Council is scheduled to pass a permanent rent control bill that will last for two years and is the same as the bill that will be activated during the last 30 days of the 90-day emergency period. The two-year bill must receive congressional review.

The revenue package includes a 4 per cent increase in the corporate and unincorporated business income tax, taxes professionals' business income for the first time, increases the gasoline tax 2 cents, repeals the sales tax on utility bills, imposes a new 8 per cent parking tax, and increases water and sewer charges, cigarettes tax and car registration fees.

The mayor also signed a bill creating a new independent office for the aging.

Nigerian in Trinidad

Agence France-Presse

PORT OF SPAIN, Trinidad July 25 — Nigerian Chief Justice Taslim O. Elias arrived in Trinidad last night for a week's visit as guest of the bar association of Trinidad and Tobago.

Magistrate Indicted as Embezzler

By Megan Rosenfeld
Washington Post Staff Writer

A former special Fairfax County magistrate has been indicted by a Circuit Court grand jury on charges of embezzling money that should have been turned over to the County General District Court.

Frank R. Payne, 39, the indictment charges, "did knowingly misuse or misappropriate" public funds while he served as magistrate. Commonwealth's Attorney Robert F. Horan said he is accused of taking $1,800, an amount found missing during a state audit this spring.

Payne, who is also a former Fairfax City policeman, resigned as magistrate in late May citing "personal problems beyond his control" in a letter of resignation. He was arrested June 24.

Appointed two years ago, Payne was one of 18 special magistrates who are located in offices throughout the county that are open all the time. As agents of the District Court, they have the power to issue warrants and collect the collaterals that citizens charged with minor offenses are allowed to post to guarantee a court appearance.

These collaterals are collected at the end of each eight hour shift, according to violations bureau director Oscar N. Dunn, and each special magistrate deposits the money he has collected.

Payne is the first appointed special magistrate to be indicted on criminal charges. In 1972, former special magistrate D. Bruce Evans, who had been elected to the post, was convicted of the same offense, which was also uncovered during an audit, and given a two-year suspended sentence and two years probation. He repaid the money he was accused of taking, almost $2,000.

NE Mother and Son Shot Dead, Gunman Kills Self in Siege

SHOOTINGS, From B1

according to friends and public records.

Mrs. Gilchrist had been with the human resources department since 1972 and earned $5,871 yearly, according to that department's records. These records also show that she previously worked as a clerk-typist for the police department, although police could not immediately confirm that.

Elbert Gilchrist, 19, the dead woman's stepson, was apparently the second person killed. According to police and the medical examiner's office, his body was found in a basement bathroom with at least two bullet wounds in his head, fired from some distance. He was pronounced dead at D.C. General Hospital.

He was described by acquaintances as an "extremely slow learner" as a result of mental retardation and apparently attended a special school. The name of the school could not be learned yesterday.

Watts finally shot himself in the right side of the head with the snubnosed revolver he used to kill his mother and stepbrother, police said. When police finally broke open the locked door to his second-floor bedroom, they found the revolver still in his hand.

William Watts was described by acquaintances as a troublesome son who often was "abusive" toward his mother and had threatened other family members.

D.C. corrections department records show he was jailed briefly three times last year —in June, August and September—on assault charges. His lawyer, Miller Marshall, said he had been charged with assaulting his stepfather during an argument. Police said his record also included an arrest for larceny.

Miller said Watts had been convicted of an assault charge in Superior Court last year but was sentenced to probation, despite the family's urging that he be committed to St. Elizabeths.

Records at St. Elizabeths show Watts was initially held at the hospital from June 19, 1974 to Aug. 27, when he was discharged to the D.C. jail. He was immediately returned to St. Elizabeths and held until Sept. 18, when psychiatrists found for a second time that he was incompetent to stand trial.

Notations on Watts' file at St. Elizabeths indicate, however, that Watts' mother was afraid of him and " explored having him committed" in June of last year, a hospital spokesman said. Records of the public defender service last October show he still regarded him as dangerous and was discussing ways of having him committed.

Watts' brother and two sisters narrowly escaped the gunfire yesterday morning.

Margerie, 14, apparently climbed through a second-story window onto a roof ledge and jumped to the ground. She was described by acquaintances as a student at nearby Miller Junior High School, but complete school records were unavailable and the school could not confirm this.

Linda, 18, who just graduated from Woodson Senior High School, and Jerome, 16, who just completed Miller Junior High, both raced out the door. According to a friend who talked with her, Watts fired one shot at Linda but missed.

Police who brought the siege to a conclusion in a tear gas barrage shortly before 9 a.m. were apparently unable to reconstruct a complete sequence of the shootings and their cause. The three surviving children do not know what prompted their brother's outburst, homicide detectives said.

Before the tear gas assault and Watts' suicide, policemen and the gunman's brother Jerome repeatedly tried to talk to Watts but, police said, he never replied.

At one point, police Capt. Richard Gurz confronted Watts on the stairway but was forced, he said, to back down the stairs. Because of what they described as a large number of bullet holes in the house, police said they concluded Watts had reloaded his gun at least once.

The quiet neighborhood was awakened after the first gunshots at 6:40 a.m. Police evacuated nearby homes and cordoned off the street. By mid-morning relatives, alerted by radio newscasts, began arriving, some of them from Baltimore.

Also contributing to this story was The Washington Post staff writer Paul Hodge.

Inmate at Lorton Stabbed to Death

STAB, From B1

when he and his brother, Edward, "had gone to Southeast Hospital to see another brother, Lorenzo, who had been shot in a dispute," Shuler said. "They got into an argument with a policeman who told them to get out of the hospital. Tyrone never came home after that."

Shuler's mother and several of her children live at 529 Valley Ave. SE. James Shuler, a D.C. environmental services department employee and his father, Mate, a retired Union Station baggageman, live at 3818 Bradley Heights, Md.

James Shuler said yesterday that "several Lorton inmates, friends of Tyrone's, called today but said they didn't know why it happened; they think maybe whoever stabbed him had the wrong person."

"There was no sign of worry two weeks ago when we visited Tyrone," James said. "He was talking about his studies at FCC (Federal City College courses given at Lorton) and looking to go over to minimum security at Occoquan."

James said his brother was born in the District, attended Eastern High School and was taken out of the home briefly and sent to Cedar Knoll, the District youth center, after "he had been playing hookey a lot."

His mother said that "I have no idea why they did it; he didn't bother anybody."

2 Say Police Agents Used Disruptive Tactics

POLICE, From B1

(D-one) countered that the City Council has "plenary legislative power" to make broad investigations.

At another point, Edward Webb, the Council's chief legal adviser, told Burka, "Simply saying that danger may exist does not excuse the witness from answering the question."

The dispute was set aside temporarily when committee members agreed to let Sgt. Sildon discuss with her superiors possible disclosures of the names next week in executive session.

Another officer, Detective Herman Oglesby, refused to specify the race of two informants who infiltrated the Black United Front, a loose coalition of local black activists, and the D.C. chapter of the Black Panther party.

"I'd rather not answer that question," said Oglesby.

"Please answer the question," said Mrs. Hardy.

"I'm not going to answer," he insisted. "I'd rather talk to my attorney first."

"I don't think Detective Oglesby should be able to pick and choose the questions he's going to answer," said council member Marion Barry (D-at large).

Again, the dispute was deferred when the committee agreed to let Oglesby return next week under subpoena with an attorney.

Judge Thompson, in setting a hearing date on the issue of Council subpoena power and enforcement, said that the case did not constitute an emergency. "The District Building and the courthouse are not going to burn down," he said.

He ordered the opposing attorneys to file written memorandums on the issues by Aug. 15 in preparation for a full hearing that could establish the precedent on the Council's power to subpoena witnesses.

Attorneys for the subpoenaed police officers contend the Council has not assured the officers of various procedural safeguards in testifying about sensitive issues of intelligence gathering, including the right to counsel and protection of sources.

NYC

PROCEDURE
PUBLIC SECURITY ACTIVITIES
OF THE
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Procedures

Public Security Activities

of the

Intelligence Division

New York City Police Department

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

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I. Mission

The Public Security function of the Intelligence Division can most simply be stated as follows: to provide the police department with the intelligence necessary to the discharge of its duties to maintain the public order, protect life and property, and insure the orderly functioning of the city and its public agencies.

II. Events or Situations Related to the Public Security Mission

A. Information will be gathered concerning those events or situations which, after a reasonable exercise of police judgement, it is concluded that there is a substantial possibility that they will or tend to:

1. Have a potential for violence or disorder
2. Adversely affect the availability of important foods and services to the public
3. Create traffic, crowd control, or noise problems or otherwise require the deployment of police personnel and/or equipment, in order to secure the free movement of vehicular and pedestrian traffic
4. Require notification to, or coordination with, other state, city or federal agencies, in order to assist them in the performance of their duties
5. Have serious national and/or international ramifications, in the event violence or disorder should ensue

6. Involve deliberate and concerted illegal behavior as a form of protest
7. Foment intergroup hostilities, counter-demonstrations, assaults, destruction of property, etc.
8. Involve groups or individuals advocating:
   a. violence and/or violent attacks on governmental operations or on police officers or other public officials
   b. racial, religious or ethnic conflict between religious and ethnic groups
   c. achievement of goals by unlawful means.

B. Examples:

1. Strikes - "job actions" - work stoppages, labor disputes
2. Disturbances, civil disorders, riots, intergroup hostilities, police-community confrontations, etc.
3. Youth gang problems - tensions, gang fights, etc.
4. Marches, meetings, parades, demonstrations, etc. which could or will involve one or more of the events or situations enumerated in sub-section II-A (above)
5. Security escorts of persons in public life who may be the potential objects of assault, assassination, or other untoward incidents, including events and situations involving the United Nations, various missions to the United Nations, consulates, embassies, foreign tourist

offices, etc.

6. Disasters.

a. natural - floods, snowstorms, hurricanes, etc.

b. accidental - plane crashes, explosions, building collapses, etc.

c. sabotage - explosions, arsons, destruction or interference with public buildings, accomodations, thoroughfares, etc.

III. Procedures

Statement of Intent:

In conducting public security activities, Intelligence Division personnel must be responsible to the legal principles and public policies that are developing with respect to the collection, storage, and dissemination of domestic intelligence data. In few other areas of professional police responsibilities is it as important to be especially sensitive to constitutional rights, societal interests and community values as in the operation of an intelligence system. "The impact of an intelligence system upon the constitutional rights of those about whom it collects information ultimately depends upon the whole of the system's operations: the categories of individuals included in its files, the persons and agencies to which it disseminates information, the provisions it

makes for verification and purging, the adequacy of its security arrangements, and so on." *

As law enforcement officers, members of the Intelligence Division performing Public Security Activities must, of necessity, pursue the goals stated in Section I in a legitimate manner, i.e., by lawful means. Furthermore, as law enforcement officers, members so assigned should recognize that the source and object of police authority and responsibility is the goal of justice under law. The law must be enforced and order maintained only in accordance with the methods considered proper by society, speaking through legislature and the courts.

Procedures, priorities, and attitudes which in the past were publicly acceptable are now being re-examined and re-defined by society at large, as well as by its governmental agencies, and will in a free society continuously be redefined. Law enforcement must strive to keep pace with these developments and to ensure that police activities reflect them. In the operation of an intelligence system, there must be special care to avoid interference with constitutionally protected rights of freedom to speak and dissent, to write and publish, and to associate for peaceful purposes, while developing the intelligence necessary for public officials to safeguard life and property.

*Basic Elements of Intelligence - A Manual of Theory, Structure and Procedures for Use by Law Enforcement Agencies Against Organized Crime. E. Drexel Godfrey and Don R. Harris, November 1971, p. 253f. Published by: Technical Assistance Division, Office of Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Department of Justice.

Care must also be taken to avoid unduly interfering with the privacy of citizens.

Accordingly, the following procedures are set forth to govern Intelligence Division personnel engaged in Public Security Activities. Because of the constitutional sensitivity of the areas involved, these rules and standards must be scrupulously observed.

A. General Procedures

1. The intelligence process in which Public Security is engaged includes the following steps:

   a. gathering of information

   b. evaluation of this information

   c. analysis of the evaluated information

   d. reporting of the results of the analysis

   e. recording and storage of information

   f. dissemination of information in Public Safety files.

This entire Public Security intelligence process should be thought of as one of critical refinement, with significant amounts of information initially gathered, but with only the most reliable, useful and important information recorded or disseminated.

Quantities of raw information are collected. This information is evaluated, whereupon some of it is rejected or discarded as irrelevant, inaccurate, or improper. Thereafter, this evaluated information is analyzed and certain predictions or projections are

arrived at. This product of the analytical process is then reported to the appropriate members of this department. Some of this information is culled from reports and recorded and stored on index cards for ready reference.

Although these procedures for the conduct of each of the steps in Public Security intelligence process must, of necessity, be strict, it is in the recording and dissemination processes that the procedures and the adherence to them must be particularly stringent.

2. Public Security Activities are to be conducted in such a manner that no infringement upon the statutory and constitutional rights of any individual, group or organization is occasioned.

   In particular, any collection of information is to be done with discretion so as to minimize the possibility that citizens will be deterred from exercising their lawful rights. Similarly, information will be collected, recorded, and disseminated only on a strict "need to know" basis in accordance with the guidelines listed in sub-paragraphs III-B, E and F below.

3. The Intelligence Division Legal Officer, an attorney, member of this department, has the responsibility for continuously reviewing and re-evaluating these procedures to ensure that they accurately reflect current legislative and

judicial decisions. The Legal Officer will advise the Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division, of any and all developments in the relevant areas of law which could require revision of these procedures. This review by the Legal Officer shall not be construed as preventing the Deputy Commissioner for Legal Matters, the Special Counsel to the Police Commissioner, or the Corporation Counsel City of New York from conducting a similar review and evaluation of these guidelines.

4. Public Security activities shall be subject to review by the Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division, the First Deputy Commissioner, or his representative to ensure compliance with these procedures.

5. All members, including undercover agents, of the Intelligence Division, will receive intensive training in relevant constitutional principles, especially those embodied in the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, upon initial assignment to the Section and periodically thereafter.

6. The following procedures relate to specific Public Security functions:

B. Information Collection Procedures

1. Only the Police Commissioner, First Deputy Commissioner, Chief of Inspectional Services, or the Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division, can direct the initiation of an investi-

gation concerning any event, situation, person, group or organization. When directing the initiation of an investigation under this section, the person so directing shall specify the purpose or object of the investigation.

2. Public Security personnel shall not gather data on any individual, group organization, publication, event or situation except to the extent that after a reasonable exercise of police judgement it is concluded that there is substantial possibility that this information will aid the police department in attaining its goal as defined in Section I. In part, this requires that the department be kept abreast of information concerning groups and individuals whose conduct or rhetoric indicates a substantial possibility that they will be involved in one of the situations described in Section II above, as, for example, the disruption of governmental operations or public activities. Care will be taken not to interfere with the exercise of legitimate rights.

a. Some examples may make the foregoing procedures more specific:

(1) the political beliefs or preferences of any individual, group or organization are not, per se, of concern to the Public Security function. However, the

activities of various groups and individuals are of legitimate interest for the Public Security function when there is a substantial possibility that they will result in personal injury, property damage, crowd control problems, or disruption of vital municipal functions.

(2) Public Security is not, per se, interested in or involved in collecting data concerning the personal habits, predilictions and associates of any person, acting either individually or through a group or organization. Such matters of of interest only when they are directly related to the mission of Public Security as stated above, and will lead to the substantial possibility of making contributions to attaining goals as defined in Section I.

(3) In gathering information about any individual or group, the activities of Public Security personnel must be strictly limited to the degree that it is absolutely necessary to achieve legitimate law enforcement objectives.

(4) Electronic surveillance will be conducted only in the strictest conformity with court authorized warrants and with the provisions of the Rules and

Procedures of this department.

(5) Photographic surveillance will not be conducted without the prior authorization of one of the following--the Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division, or when directed by the First Deputy Commissioner or Chief of the Inspectional Services Bureau. Such authorization will be given when deemed to be necessary to accomplish the Public Security mission, as defined in Section I. Photographic surveillance will be approved in the following instances:

(a) to identify persons who, either as individuals or as members of associates of groups or organizations, are involved in acts of violence or other violations of law; or

(b) to provide evidence of such violations of law; or

(c) to identify individuals or groups who may pose a threat to the safety of persons who hold (or are candidates for) public office and to the safety of other persons in public life for whom this department may be called upon to provide personal security escorts.

6. The use of an undercover agent (infiltrator) will be permitted only after approval by the First Deputy Commissioner or his special designee. Such approval will be given only upon the determination that there is a reasonable need to develop information about the activities of the group or organization that is the object of the proposed operation, and that the intelligence activity proposed is reasonably related to the gathering of such information. After the officer recommended for the undercover assignment has received adequate training in the appropriate conduct of such an operation, the First Deputy Commissioner, or his special designee, will give final approval to the actual inception of the undercover investigation. The First Deputy Commissioner, or his special designee, will be regularly apprised of the activities of any undercover agent.

7. To enable the Analysis Section of the Intelligence Division to perform its function properly, and to give appropriate weight to the information being submitted, Public Security members submitting

information are to report its source by notations such as "personal observation," "publication," "public announcement," "newspaper," "magazine," "radio or television program," etc. (When an informant is the source of the information; a statement regarding the informant's reliability shall be included and the basis for such judgement concerning his reliability.)

C. Analysis Guidelines

1. All raw intelligence information received by Public Security Personnel will be formally evaluated by the Analysis Section prior to any reporting, recording/filing, or dissemination.

2. Only information which bears a substantial relevance to the Public Security goal of providing necessary intelligence to this department will be reported, recorded/filed or disseminated. If the information is not substantially relevant, it will be discarded for purposes of analysis and the report destroyed with concurrence of Chief Analyst or Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division.

3. After formal evaluation of the information, the following classification system will be employed, where applicable:

Importance (Seriousness of Subject Matter)

A-Major e.g., large disorders; major strikes; large demonstrations; major parades; visits to New York City by highly contro-

versial persons; incidents involving use of weapons/deadly devices, or crimes against persons, or serious property damage; etc.

B-Intermediate e.g., less serious strikes; smaller parades; local disturbances; incidents involving less serious property damage, less serious disruption of the peace, or interference with governmental processes, etc.

C-Minor e.g., small demonstrations, visits to New York City by minor foreign dignitaries, etc.

Time Priority (Urgency with which police action or attention must be addressed to this matter.)

1. = Very High Time Priority - within 24 hours

2. = High Time Priority - within 24-72 hours

3. = Medium Time Priority - within 3-7 days

4. = Low Time Priority - more than 7 days

5. = For information only - requires no further action

Source

H = Highly Reliable

R = Reliable

U = Unknown Reliability

Content

S = Substantiated

N = Not Substantiated

4. If the nature and source of the information being evaluated is such that further investigation by Public Security personnel or by other investigative units of this department is warranted, the Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division, subject to the review of the Police Commissioner or the First Deputy Commissioner is responsible for:

   a. Deciding such additional investigation is required

   b. Directing the information to the appropriate unit of this department for investigation.

5. Once the information has been evaluated, the Analysis Section must assemble the available data, concerning the subject under investigation. From these facts, the unit must attempt to develop an assessment of the causes and significance of a past event or to project future developments of interest to units of the department. This analysis will thereupon be reviewed by the Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division who has three (3) alternatives. He can decide that:

   a. The analysis is correct

b. The analysis is incorrect and/or incomplete and should be revised.

c. The event or situation requires further investigation.

D. Reporting Guidelines

1. Public Security Section reports and communications must be:

a. Objective - the presentation must be as objective as possible to encourage decisions which are based on accurate information and sound analysis.

b. Discriminating - the report must distinguish between positive, verified information and hypotheses, hearsay or inferences.

c. Logical - the findings must be presented in a logical manner.

d. Concise - the report should be as brief as possible, consistent with the requirements of accuracy and objectivity.

e. Recipient-oriented - the format and content of the report should be consistent with the identity, interests and needs of the intended recipient.

2. Public Security reports and communications are of three (3) general types:

a. Strategic/indicative - the result of analysis of certain data indicating general background information, trends, patterns, forecasts or possible courses of action. These are routed through the office of the Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division.

b. Tactical/evidential - information which pertains to a specific event or situation and which requires immediate or future action by this department. These are routed through the appropriate operational command.

c. Informational/for file only - information which is not to be forwarded at this time, but which is to be retained in Public Security files for future reference.

3. All written reports emanating from Public Security shall be subject to the final approval of the Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division or, in his absence, the Executive Officer.

4. Reports determined by the Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division to be of an unusually sensitive nature shall be prominently marked "Restricted--Authorized Access Only." File copies thereof are to be stored in locked cabinets, separate and apart from other reports maintained at the Records Section. Access to these "Restricted-- Authorized Access Only" files shall be limited to the Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division, the Executive Officer, Public Security Coordinator,

and to designated members of this command on a strict "need to know" basis, and those assigned to the necessary clerical tasks connected with this file. Strict security procedures will be followed.

E. Procedures for the Recording and Storage of Information in the Public Security Card Files

1. Prior to recording and storage in the Public Security card files, all information must be reviewed by the Analysis Section.

2. Such information must be evaluated as bearing a substantial possibility of making a contribution to the goals of the Intelligence Division set forth in Section I, to provide necessary intelligence to enable this department to perform its legitimate police service functions. All information not meeting this criteria must be rejected and will not be stored in the Public Security card file.

3. Information which merely reflects the political preferences, personal habits, predilections, associations, or activities of any person, group or organization and which is not substantially relevant to legitimate police service purposes will not be stored in the Public Security files, but will be destroyed.

4. Information evaluated as being appropriate for storage

in Public Security card file shall be capsulized on color-coded 4 x 6 index cards. A different specified color will be utilized yearly to indicate the year in which the information was included in Public Security files. This color-coded card system facilitates periodic review and re-evaluation of all information in the Public Security files.

5. Information to be stored in Public Security files must:

   a. be concise, yet accurate

   b. not lead to erroneous impressions

   c. be objective, i.e. - not biased or slanted

   d. not be repetitive or trivial.

6. The card on which the information is recorded must indicate the following:

   a. original source of the information - e.g., personal observation, informant, leaflet, newspaper/magazine account, radio - T.V. program, etc. If the information was received from an informant, an evaluation must be made of the reliability of the informant, and the basis for such a judgement.

   b. Intelligence Division report or communication from which the information has been culled

   c. where applicable, the classification assigned to the information - viz:

H = Highly reliable
R = Reliable
U = Unknown reliability
S = Substantiated
N = Not substantiated

F. Public Security Activities Procedures for Dissemination of Information

Patrol Guide 116-22, page 1, provides that "A member of this department shall treat as confidential the official business of the department" and lists the types of departmental information which can be disclosed and to whom and under what circumstances it may be disseminated. In addition to this provision of the Patrol Guide, it must be kept in mind that some of the information stored in the Public Security files is of a particularly sensitive nature. Therefore, the following procedures must be observed.

1. Intra-departmental dissemination

   a. The only information which is to be disseminated by Public Security to other members and units of this department is that which would further the goal of providing this department with the necessary intelligence to perform its legitimate police service functions.

b. Dissemination of such information must be approved by the Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division or his designated representative.

c. Such members of the department seeking information contained in Public Security files must comply with the procedures of S.O.P. 2, 1971, Section IV-D-1-c. In passing upon such requests, all of the following factors must be considered:

(1) nature of the information (if any) available at the Public Security Files - e.g., criminal record information; general intelligence information, etc.

(2) source of this information - undercover agent, informant, leaflet, newspaper/magazine article, radio, T.V. program, other law enforcement agency etc.

(3) classification of this information - highly reliable, reliable, unknown reliability, substantiated, not substantiated

(4) rank, assignment and identity of the members of the service requesting the information

(5) reason for the request - i.e., the nature of the

investigation being conducted by the requesting member of the service - e.g., homicide, explosion, arson, narcotics, gambling, etc.

These and all other relevant factors must be considered in arriving at a determination concerning possible dissemination of information in the public Security files and the type and amount of such information to be disseminated. The evaluation of all these factors will determine the propriety of honoring the request and will test the "need to know" of the person or unit requesting information from the Public Security files.

Almost all such requests are received during normal business hours when determination concerning this "need to know" is made by the superior officer in carge of the Records Section, a superior officer who has extensive experience in police intelligence and intensive training concerning all aspects of these procedures.

Emergency requests (during other than normal business hours) for information in Public Security files are received by the Officer-in-Charge, at the Records Section, as per S.O.P. 2, s. 1971, each of whom shall have been instructed in these duties and will have been thoroughly trained concerning these procedures.

In all cases where any doubt exists in the mind of the Officer-in Charge at the time of the receipt of such a request, he must contact

the Executive Officer, Intelligence Division or the Public Security Coordinator.

2. Extra-Departmental Dissemination

a. Under no circumstances will Public Security information ever be disseminated formally or informally to non-governmental individuals or agencies.

b. Public Security information will be disseminated only to specifically designated representatives of bona fide law enforcement agencies and of certain specified state, federal, municipal and local governmental agencies. Information which does not bear a substantial relationship to the legitimate responsibilities of the requesting agency will in no instance be disseminated from the Public Security files.

c. Prior to dissemination of information in the Public Security files, all of the following factors must be evaluated and analyzed:

(1) nature of the information -- criminal record, raw intelligence, etc.

(2) source of the information

(3) classification of the information

(4) agency requesting the information

(5) reason for the request - i.e., the use which the requesting agency will make of the information, if disseminated - e.g., investigation, prosecution of serious criminal nature, security clearance for employment in sensitive governmental agency, etc. Once again, these and all other relevant factors must be considered in arriving at a determination concerning possible dissemination of information in the Public Security files and the type and amount of such information to be disseminated. The evaluation of these factors will determine the requesting agency's "need to know."

d. Information contained in the Public Security files will be transmitted in writing to governmental and law enforcement agencies only over the signature of the Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division.

e. When time demands preclude written requests for information from Public Security files or written replies thereto, telephone requests for such information will be honored if made by properly authorized representatives of the agencies listed in Section IV-D-2.

To ensure the legitimacy of the request and to preclude unauthorized dissemination of Public Security information, the following procedures are to be followed:

(1) telephone call will be made by the recipient of the request to the requesting agency to verify the authenticity of the caller and of the request.

(2) if during normal business hours, the Records Section superior officer will evaluate the request and approve same if appropriate. During other hours, a superior officer will be conferred with concerning approval of the telephonic request.

(3) record of the request and of the information disseminated (if any) will be made in the Intelligence Log and Public Security card file.

(4) in all cases, the Supervisor, Analysis Section, and the Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division, are to be notified of the request and disposition.

3. Dissemination of Surveillance Photos

Surveillance photos - much more so than criminal identification photos - are of a particularly sensitive nature. Accordingly, their dissemination must be

strictly limited to instances involving the most compelling, legitimate law enforcement purposes; such as investigations of homicides, bombings, kidnappings, and similar extremely serious matters. Only the Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division, will approve dissemination of the surveillance photographs. In emergencies, the Public Security Coordinator, or Executive Officer, Intelligence Division, may make this dissemination.

Only the Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division can authorize the extra-departmental dissemination of surveillance photos. He will do so only to bona fide enforcement agencies for such legitimate law enforcement purposes as identification of persons being sought for homicides, bombings, kidnappings or similar extremely serious matters. In emergencies, the Public Security Coordinator, or Executive Officer, Intelligence Division, may make this dissemination.

G. Re-Evaluation Process

1. The Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division and the Public Security Coordinator must continuously review and re-evaluate Public Security operations.
2. Procedures concerning Public Security operations are to be continuously reviewed and re-evaluated, at least

annually, by the Intelligence Division Legal Officer, to ensure that they still accurately reflect statutory developments and relevant decisions in the area of constitutional law. The results of such review shall be reported, in writing, to the Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division, the First Deputy Commissioner, and to the Chief of the Inspectional Services Bureau. This review by the Intelligence Division Legal Officer shall not be construed as preventing those named in paragraph III-A-3 from a similar review and evaluation of these guidelines.

3. The events, situations, individuals, groups and organizations about which information is collected, recorded, or disseminated from the Public Security files will be frequently reviewed by the Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division, Public Security Coordinator, Intelligence Division Legal Officer and Chief Analyst, to determine the degree to which such information continues to have a substantial possibility of making a contribution to the goal of providing this department with the intelligence required to perform its legitimate police service functions. If that relationship no longer exists, processing of such information will be terminated without delay and the files purged.

4. The color-coded index cards maintained in the Public Security files should be reviewed frequently to determine whether the information on the card still relates to a legitimate Public Security function. Every card in the file will be reviewed and re-evaluated at least once within two (2) years of its initial filing. This review will be performed by the Analysis Section. In reviewing a card, one of the following three (3) dispositions must be made:

a. Maintain in active file - still of current interest to Public Security

b. Purged - the information on the card no longer serves a legitimate police service intelligence purpose. Cards that are purged from the file will be promptly destroyed. Although there is a danger that some potentially valuable intelligence information will be lost in the purging process, it is deemed imperative, in the interests of accuracy, of relevancy, and of constitutionally sound law enforcement practice, that this re-evaluation and purging process be conducted on a continuing basis.

will be reviewed and re-evaluated each year by the Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division, to determine if any of them ought to be deleted from this list or if others should be added.*

7. Reports marked "Restricted--Authorized Access Only" shall be declassified as soon as the subject matter no longer necessitates its inclusion in the "Restricted--Authorized Access Only" files as determined by the Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division. Periodic review, at least anually, as determined by the Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division, of "Restricted--Authorized Access Only" reports will be made for this purpose.

IV. Methods of Gathering, Analysis, Recording and Dissemination of Information:

A. Gathering of Information

1. Sources:

a. Overt sources

(1) assigned personnel, Public Security

(2) other police department personnel (patrol service, detective bureau, etc.)

*Those agencies marked (*) in Section IV-D-2 are being re-evaluated in this way.

(3) other governmental agencies

(a) law enforcement agencies, e.g. F.B.I., New York State Police, United States Treasury Department, Alcohol, Tax, Firearms, and others

(b) non-law enforcement agencies, e.g., United States State Department, etc.

(4) general public

(5) Police Department records

(6) public records and documents

(7) mass media--radio, television, various newspapers, magazines, etc.

(8) leaflets, underground press, publications of various groups

(9) public libaries

(10) intra- and extra-departmental conferences

b. Covert sources

(1) undercover agents (police personnel)

(2) informants

(3) court authorized electronic surveillance

(4) physical surveillance, including photographic surveillance

B. Analysis - Prediction/Projection - Report

1. Analysis

The Analysis Section, Intelligence Division, performs the following functions:

a. All available information from the aforementioned sources--overt and covert--is assembled in a logical manner

b. Informational gaps will be identified

c. Attempts will be made to secure the additional data and, if obtained, it will be integrated with that which has been previously assembled

d. The reliability and weight of the various items of information will be assessed

e. The various items of information, the inter-relationships between these items, and the possible significance of the particular event or situation are to be considered and evaluated.

2. Prediction/Projection

Based upon this evaluation and analysis, the Analysis Section will make a prediction or projection concerning the particular event or situation. This projection/prediction may include one or more of the following:

a. Purpose, reason or cause of the event

b. Nature of the situation

c. Groups and/or individuals involved

d. Number of persons expected

e. Locations affected

f. Time and/or duration of the event or situation

g. Potential for disorder

h. Effect upon the city, the department, visiting dignitaries, other individuals, etc.

i. Significance of the event or situation

j. Evolving patterns and trends

k. Recommendations for consideration by the Commanding Officers of various units concerning possible police action to be taken.

3. Reports:

Written and or l reports, encompassing these predictions/projections and other salient information, will be prepared by the Analysis Section for the Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division who will forward them to other appropriate departmental officials. In this manner, intelligence will be transmitted which will aid in the effective deployment of police personnel

and equipment, for the particular event or situation.

C. Recording of Information at Public Security, Intelligence Division

1. Log - Information telephoned in by Public Security members in the field and by other departmental sources will be recorded in the "log" as it is received. The type of information thus recorded involves ongoing situations, scheduled future events, notifications, requests, etc.

2. Written Reports and Communications - Written reports and communications, whether originating with Public Security personnel or others, will be serially numbered and filed by year of preparation. Where applicable, one of the following letters is appended to the control number of the report:

   I = Investigative

   L = Liaison

   A = Analysis

   X = Administration

3. Diary - Future events or situations of the type listed in paragraph II-A (above) are to be listed in the "diary" according to the date on which they reportedly will occur. Thus, the "diary" will provide a ready reference concerning events scheduled for any given day.

4. Card File - After evaluation, information deemed appropriate for retention consonant with Public Security procedures (Section III, above), will be capsulized on 4 x 6 index cards, which are to be color-coded to indicate the year of inclusion into Public Security files and to facilitate periodic review and re-evaluation.

5. Photo File

a. By event

b. By sphere of interest or activity

c. By name

D. Dissemination of Information by Public Security Personnel

1. Intra-Departmental

a. Disseminated on Public Security Initiative:

(1) Tactical Information - i.e., information requiring immediate or future deployment of police personnel and/or equipment. Such information is transmitted by written report or by telephone to the appropriate departmental official. The Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division, is also apprised thereof for his information.

(2) Strategic Information - (i.e., information indicating evolving trends and patterns and/or which may

have a bearing on the formation of departmental policies and responses, etc.) Such information is transmitted by written report or by telephone to the Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division, who thereupon disseminates it to the appropriate department officials.

b. Requested by Field Units:

(1) Records Section

This intra-departmental dissemination of intelligence from Public Security files to field units will be controlled by the Records Section. The authority and responsibility for this dissemination is delegated to the Records Section superior. He and his staff are thoroughly instructed in the legal and administrative regulations governing the dissemination of intelligence information. They are to be assigned to these positions on a steady, long-term basis, to ensure that they will continue to possess the necessary expertise to perform this function properly. In all instances involving intelligence information, the Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division, Executive Officer, or Public Security Coordinator is con-

sulted by the Records Section, prior to any dissemination.

c. Procedures for Requests from Field Units

On April 7, 1971, this department promulgated S.O.P. 2, s. 1971, entitled: "Procedures to Encourage flow of information to the Intelligence Division from Field Units and the Obtaining of Information from Records Maintained at the Major Crime and Public Security files of the Intelligence Division." The relevant sections thereof read as follows: "Members of this Department requesting information concerning the identity of persons or leaders of groups who have violated sections of the law while engaged in the disruption of governmental activities or the peace and harmony of the community shall telephone the Operations Desk (577-7285). "When it is determined that information in the files of the Intelligence Division is useful to the requesting member, the commanding officer of such member shall prepare a request in duplicate, on official department letterhead, that access to the files be granted. The request shall contain:

(1) the rank, name, shield number and command of the members of the department conducting the investigation.

(2) available information on the subject being investigated - e.g., name, addresses, known places of employment, affiliations, etc.

(3) Reason for request including control number--e.g., Complaint Report - PD 313-152, case number, etc.

"The designated member will deliver the official letterhead (PD 158-151) to the Records Section at the time he appears to receive the intelligence report.

A log will be maintained...to record the receipt of these requests.

Records should ordinarily be viewed during regular office hours - i.e., 0900-1700 hours, Monday through Friday. However, in IMPORTANT cases where time may be a factor and some useful information is available, the superior officer in charge of the Records Section may give the information by telephone to a properly identified member of the department. Confirmation of the request and receipt of the information must be acknowledged within 48 hours by the sub-

mission of an official letterhead (PD 158-151) as indicated above. It should be noted that the Intelligence Division is in operation 24 hours each day and will furnish available information in emergency situations.

Commanding Officers of requesting commands shall evaluate the necessity of viewing records contained in the Public Security files before forwarding requests.

The person designated to view records should be knowledgeable in the subject matter of the investigation so that there will be a proper evaluation of the material furnished.

Upon completion of an investigation in which information was requested from the Intelligence Division, Records Section, a report of the results of the investigation shall be forwarded to the Records Section of the Intelligence Division from which the information was received. It should include any new information obtained by the investigator. It will be evaluated with the object of adding to, correcting, and expanding the intelligence information currently on file."

2. Extra-Departmental

Requests for information contained in Public Security files, if received on official letterhead, signed by the Commanding Officer/Director, or the specifically designated liaison officer of the following governmental agencies, will be honored, consonant with the Dissemination Procedures set forth in subsection III-F above:

a. Federal Agencies

*(1) Civil Service Commission - Investigations Division

*(2) Department of the Air Force - Office of Special Investigations (OSI)

*(3) Department of the Army - Intelligence - 109th MI Group

(4) Department of Defense - Security Division

(5) Department of Justice - Federal Bureau of Investigation

(6) Department of Justice - Immigration and Naturalization Service (USINS)

*(7) Department of Navy - Navy Investigation Service - Intelligence Recruiting

(8) Any duly constituted judicial, legislative, regulatory, or administrative body having subpoena powers.

*(9) National Security Agency (NSA)

(10) State Department - Office of Security

(11) Treasury Department - Alcohol, Tax, Firearms (ATF)

(12) Treasury Department - Bureau of Customs

(13) Treasury Department - Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

(14) Treasury Department - Internal Revenue Service (IRS)

(15) Treasury Department - U.S. Secret Service (USSS)

(16) United States Coast Guard - Intelligence

(17) United States Postal Service (Postal Inspection Service)

b. State Agencies

(1) Department of Correctional Services - Bureau of Special Services

(2) New York State Identification and Intelligence System (NYSIIS)

(3) State Police - Special Services Division

(4) Waterfront Commissioner, New York Harbor

(5) Port of New York Authority (Police)

*-See Sub-section III-G-6 above.

c. Municipal Agencies

(1) Department of Correction, City of New York

(2) Department of Investigation

(3) Department of Personnel

(4) Fire Department - Examining Unit - Fire Marshal

(5) New York City Housing Authority - Police Department

(6) New York City Transit Police Department

(7) District Attorney Office Squads

(8) All New York City Police Department Units

d. Police Department Intelligence Units Throughout The United States.

3. Processing of Extra-Departmental Requests for Information in Public Security Files.

a. Name Checks - (Forwarded by the above agencies to Public Security on a routine basis

(1) If no information in the Public Security Files, the name check requests are stamped "No Record" by Public Security Personnel searching.

*-See Sub-Section III-G-6 above.

the files. These forms are then mailed to the requesting agency by the Records Section (see sub-paragraph IV-D-1-b above)

(2) If Public Security files do reflect relevant information, the Records Section Detective searching the files will attach to the name check request all 4 x 6 cards possibly relating to the subject of the inquiry and will be delivered to the Records Section. Here the information is evaluated as to relevancy and as to the propriety of the dissemination thereof, based upon the Dissemination Procedures. Prior to actual dissemination of any such information, the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Intelligence Division, or Supervisor, Analysis Section will be consulted for a final decision.

b. [redacted] - (i.e., letters from the specified governmental agencies enumerated in sub-paragraph IV-D-2 above or from bona fide law enforcement agencies requesting information from the Public Security Files are to be processed as follows, again, consistant with the Dissemination Procedures

set forth in section III-F above.

(1) logged into the Public Security Communication Book and serially numbered each year by Information Control.

(2) assigned to Liaison Section detective

(3) Liaison Section detective will confer with Analysis Section to determine information required

(4) draft of reply will then be reviewed by Analysis Section

(5) draft reply is then reviewed by Supervisor, Liaison Section

(6) Approved draft will then be prepared for signature of Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division for final review

(7) reply will then be sent to requesting agency if approved by Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division

(8) all information disseminated pursuant to these guidelines, whether verbal or written, will be with the understanding that the requesting agency agrees to strictly conform with the provisions of these procedures as set forth in III F 2-3 and IV D 2-3 These relevant sections will be furnished to these

agencies who have not previously received the aforementioned provisions of these Procedures at the time of their initial request.

(9) information disseminated under these Procedures will have the following restrictive statement, prominently stamped on the cover letter or read to the requesting party in those cases arising under III F (2) (c)

"THE INFORMATION FURNISHED IS DISSEMINATED PURSUANT TO THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION PROCEDURES OF THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT AND IS THE PROPERTY OF THAT DEPARTMENT. IT SHOULD NOT BE DISCLOSED TO ANY PERSON OR ORGANIZATION EXCEPT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS III F (2) (3) AND SECTIONS IV D (2) (3) OF THE AFORESAID PROCEDURES.

L.A.

THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
PUBLIC DISORDER INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES

April 10, 1975

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LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT

Public Disorder Intelligence Division

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLE AND PURPOSE

The Los Angeles Police Department is charged with the primary responsibility for maintaining public order in Los Angeles. This includes both law-enforcement and peace-keeping functions.

As one necessary means to fulfill these duties, the Department maintains the Public Disorder Intelligence Division (PDID). Its function is to develop and maintain information which the Department needs to successfully meet its responsibility to protect the community.

The Department recognizes that special care and precaution must be taken in this area to avoid interfering with or impairing the constitutional rights of citizens to maintain their privacy, to speak and dissent freely, to write and to publish, and to associate privately and publicly for any lawful purpose whatsoever.

No other aspect of the Department's duties requires such detached and sensitive judgments on the part of individual peace officers. Nowhere else is reverence for the law more demanding and demanded.

Therefore, the primary mission of PDID is the collection and maintenance of only that information which is necessary to protect the citizens of Los Angeles from unlawful disruption of the public order and from unlawful intereference with their legally protected civil rights.

In general, the political and personal beliefs or preferences of any individual, group, or organization are not of relevance or of concern to the Department. Individuals and organizations are of concern to the Department only when their activities substantially threaten to result in public disorder.

The guidelines which follow establish standards and procedures for the collection and retention of information which are consistent with an open society, with a democratic form of government, and with constitutionally protected rights of privacy and expression.

I. DEFINITIONS.

A. *"Disruptive" or "disruption of the public order"* shall mean ideologically motivated illegal acts which can reasonably be expected to result in bodily injury, property damage, or interference with the conduct of governmental functions or with the lawful activities of organizations or individuals; or illegal acts which threaten the security of public buildings, threaten the public's right of access to public facilities, or threaten the public security.

B. *"Organization"* shall mean any association, collection, or group of individuals.

C. *"Unlawful"* shall mean evidence of violation of state statutes, federal statutes, or City ordinances which concern disruptions of the public order.

D. *"To advocate"* shall mean that one or more leaders of an organization have communicated to another individual, on behalf of that organization, a threat, commitment, attempt, or plan to disrupt the public order.

E. *"In Los Angeles"* shall mean conduct which occurs within the City of Los Angeles or within the immediate vicinity thereof or conduct which can reasonably be expected to affect the City of Los Angeles.

F. *"Listing"* shall mean the gathering, analysis, recording, and storage of information with respect to a specific organization or individual.

G. *"Files"* shall mean collections of information in the form of file cards, reports, photographic materials, and tape recordings.

H. *"Dissemination"* shall mean the communication of any information contained within PDID files to any person not assigned to PDID. This shall include communications initiated by PDID personnel (whether to persons inside or outside of the Department) as well as communications made in response to specific requests for information (received from persons either inside or outside of the Department).

I. *"Leaders of Organizations"* shall mean those individuals who speak for or act on behalf of, or who determine the policies and practices of, or who are the officers of said organizations.

J. *"Serious threat"* shall mean that there is credible evidence that the organization intends to and has the ability to cause a major disruption of the public order.

II. STANDARDS GOVERNING THE LISTING OF SPECIFIC ORGANIZATIONS

A. Files shall be maintained with respect to organizations which advocate disruption of the public order *and* whose members have threatened, attempted, planned, or performed acts disruptive of the public order in Los Angeles.

B. Files shall be maintained with respect to organizations which possess or attempt to acquire quantities of arms, ammunition, or explosives for unlawful purposes.

C. Files shall be maintained with respect to organizations whose primary purpose is sustaining or financing organizations described in Sections "II.A" or "II.B", above.

III. STANDARDS GOVERNING THE LISTING OF INDIVIDUALS

A. Files shall be maintained with respect to individuals who have threatened, attempted, planned, or performed acts disruptive of the public order in Los Angeles.

B. Files shall be maintained with respect to the leaders of organizations which have been listed in accordance with *Section II* above.

C. Files shall *not* be maintained with respect to individuals on the basis of mere membership in organizations unless such organizations have been listed in accordance with *Section II* above *and* such organizations are found to constitute a serious threat to the public order.

Written approval of the Chief of Police, with the advice and consent of the President of the Board of Police Commissioners, shall be required to designate organizations whose members may be listed on the basis of mere membership.

The Chief of Police shall annually review the organizations whose individual members are listed within this category to determine the continued appropriateness of designating such organizations. The Chief shall report the results of such review to the President of the Board of Police Commissioners.

IV. CLASSIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION OF FILES AND LISTS

PDID shall maintain a "File of Individuals," a "File of Organizations," a "File of Source Materials," a "File of Significant Dates," and a "List of Potential Victims."

A. The "File of Individuals" shall consist of alphabetically arranged cards. Each card shall contain the following sections:

(1) The name, aliases, addresses, and other relevant identifying information;

(2) A statement of the specific reasons for the listing of this individual;

(3) A brief summary of each specific piece of related intelligence information included in the "File of Source Materials," a cross reference to the source material, a description of the source, a coded evaluation of the relative reliability of the source, and the relevant dates of the information;

(4) A notation of each dissemination with respect to this individual and a cross reference to each Inquiry/Dissemination Log entry.

B. The "File of Organizations" shall consist of alphabetically arranged cards. Each card shall contain the following sections:

(1) The name, location(s), and other relevant identifying information;

(2) A statement of the specific reason for listing this organization;

(3) A brief summary of each piece of related intelligence information included in the "File of Source Materials," a cross reference to the source material, a description of the source, a coded evaluation of the relative reliability of the source, and the relevant dates of the information;

(4) A notation of each dissemination with respect to this organization and a cross reference to each Inquiry/Dissemination Log entry.

C. The "File of Source Materials" shall contain only such information as is relevant and necessary to the mission of PDID.

A source document may be an Intelligence Report (Form 1.89), a publication, or information compiled from other sources.

All intelligence information is to be identified by date and specific source.

Each item of intelligence information shall be separately numbered and cross referenced to the appropriate "File of Individuals" and/or "File of Organizations."

D. The "File of Significant Dates" shall consist of a list of calendar dates which have been in the past or which may become occasions for public disorders.

Appropriate information shall accompany the entry.

E. The "List of Potential Victims" shall consist of a list of organizations and individuals who in the past have been targets of attacks or disruptions or who there is a reasonable basis to believe may become targets of attacks or disruptions.

Each card shall include identification of the potential victim, and the reasons for inclusion of the organization or individual in this list.

V. STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE RECORDING AND STORAGE OF INFORMATION IN THE FILES

A. Each entry, and each corresponding source document, shall contain only such information which bears substantial relevance to the mission of PDID.

All other information gathered by PDID shall be deleted and destroyed prior to the filing of the source material and/or the making of a card entry.

B. The initiation of a file with respect to an organization or an individual not then currently listed shall require the specific approval of the Commanding Officer of PDID.

C. The subsequent addition of each item of information to the file of source materials or to the file card of an organization or individual not then currently listed shall require the evaluation and specific approval of one of the Section Officers-In-Charge.

D. As to file information in the form of photographs or tapes: only the likeness or voice of the file subject shall appear, unless the likeness or voice of additional individuals are also relevant and necessary to the mission of PDID or unless the photographs or tapes depict the commission of a crime.

VI. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

A. Intelligence Reports (Form 1.89) generated as a result of police investigations. The original source must be identified (by name or number) on the form together with an indication of the relative reliability of the information.

B. Publications and other public communication sources.

C. Communications from other law enforcement agencies. The source shall be identified, by name or code number, together with an indication of the relative reliability of the information.

VII. STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES FOR DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE FILES

A. Intelligence information may be provided to other personnel of LAPD or to outside law enforcement agencies only on a need-to-know basis.

B. "Need to know" for an outside law enforcement agency shall mean that the requested information is both useful and necessary in assisting that law enforcement agency in performing in its jurisdiction the same mission as PDID.

C. "Need to know" for other personnel of LAPD shall mean that the requested information is both useful and necessary in preventing disruption of the public order in Los Angeles.

D. The agency to which the information is given shall be on a list approved by the Commanding Officer of PDID. Prior approval of one of the Section Officers-In-Charge shall be obtained before any information is provided to anyone outside of PDID.

E. As to outside law enforcement agencies which have a functioning operation comparable to that of PDID, information shall only be disseminated to an intelligence officer of such agency. As to outside law enforcement agencies which do not have a functioning operation comparable to that of PDID, only information compiled from publications or other public sources shall be disseminated, and such information shall only be disseminated to police personnel who are section heads or above or acting section heads. As to other personnel of LAPD, information shall be disseminated only to Team or Section Leaders or above or acting Team or Section Leaders.

F. An Inquiry/Dissemination Log shall be maintained on a chronological basis. It shall contain:

(1) A record of each inquiry and/or dissemination whether concerning an outside agency or another LAPD Division;

(2) The name of the person and agency requesting such information;

(3) The stated need to know;

(4) The name of the LAPD person approving the dissemination of the information;

(5) An indication of the information provided.

A notation shall be made on the appropriate "Individual" and/or "Organization" file card as to what information was provided.

VIII. REVIEW PROCESS: REMOVAL OF FILE CARD ENTRIES AND DESTRUCTION OF FILE CARDS

A. The files of each listed Organization and Individual shall be reviewed at least annually by supervisory personnel selected by and under the direction of the Commanding Officer of PDID.

Information which is outdated or, for some other reason, no longer relevant shall be removed and destroyed. Removal of specific items of information shall require the approval of a PDID Section Officer-In-Charge.

A file with respect to a listed organization or individual which is outdated or, for some other reason, no longer necessary shall be removed and destroyed. Removal of specific files shall require the approval of the Commanding Officer of PDID.

B. A file with respect to any listed organization or individual which has lain dormant (i.e., received no file entries) for a period of seven years shall be removed and destroyed *unless* good and substantial cause exists for its retention.

In the event that such file cards are retained, an explanation shall be entered on the card which specifies the reasons for retention.

IX. AUDITING OF THE PUBLIC DISORDER INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

At least once each quarter the President of the Board of Police Commissioners shall appoint one of its members to audit the operation of PDID in order to monitor its compliance with these guidelines.

At the time of the audit specified above, said Commissioner shall be advised by PDID as to which organizations and individuals have been added to the file and which ones have been deleted.

X. FILE SECURITY

The Commanding Officer of PDID shall be responsible for the promulgation of procedures to ensure necessary file security.

Council list

Committee Questions
Hearings

General Areas to be Covered in Questioning of both Uniformed and Undercover officers: (Where only Uniformed=UO; only Undercover=UC)

Full Name - Present Position - Present Location
How long with Department
When with Intelligence Division (NOn-criminal)
Who was Supervisor
Training received for intelligence duties
Instructions received regarding mission of intelligence duties
Specific assignments
Methods of carrying out assignments

Special Employees - Also called Informants, Sources, Unsworn employees

Did you recruit any yourself? How? How many? How were they paid?
Were there some who were paid more than others? Why?
What instructions did you give to sources regarding their assignments?
How did they report back to you? How reliable was this information?
What did you do with this information?

Undercover Officers - Also called - Undercover Sworn Officers
UO: Were any assigned to you?
Where did these officers come from -- how recruited?
What instructions did you give to them generally and for specific assignments?

Organizations Monitored:
What organizations were assigned to you? Who made these assignments?
Was assignment made verbally or in writing? Do you still have copies?
What instructions were given for monitoring assigned groups?
Have you ever been involved in infiltration of college campuses -- either through giving an assignment, or receiving an assignment?

Individuals Monitored:
What nature of information were you assigned to collect on individuals?
To whom did you report this information? For what purpose was it used?

Personal Files: (on individuals):
What did these files consist of? Where did information come from?
Who had access to these files? Did other agencies? Other Officers from other parts of Department? How was information transmitted out of the Division? How useful do you feel these personal files were?

Demonstrations:
What ways did you have of knowing they were about to occur? How did you prepare for a deomnstration? With what were pictures taken of demonstrators? What guidelines were given by your superiors regarding your activities during demonstrations?

COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES:
With what agencies did Intelligence Division share information on mutual give-and-take basis? How was this done -- in writing or verbally? What types of information was transmitted to other agencies?

PRESS RELEASE
7/24/75

TINA HOBSON OBJECTS TO SURVEILLANCE HEARING PROCEDURE

Tina Hobson, wife of Councilman Julius W. Hobson, objected this morning to the procedures used in selecting witnesses for the Council hearings on Police surveillance. Ms. Hobson stated:

Importance of Hearings. "This is the first time D. C. citizens have had an opportunity to question the Police on non criminal surveillance activities. I am sure the precedence of these meetings created organizational problems for Council members; however, the significance of the hearings demands the use of a format through which it is clearly demonstrated that the police serve the citizens and that it is not the citizens who serve the police. First we need to determine what areas must be emphasized, second, how best we can approach these areas with questioning, and third, who and/or what can provide us with the best answers. Input from the public at this point, particularly from those who were under surveillance, is essential in providing Council members and these hearings with a direction that will not only discover the reasoning and purpose behind this blatant disregard for civil rights but also aid in developing permanent safeguards against future abuse.

Reasons for interruption. "The attached WASHINGTON POST article is my credential to present testimony at these hearings. Yet I was first told I could not testify and then banished to a third day of hearings announced yesterday evening--apparently designed to appease concerned and involved citizens. I respectfully ask the Council to be heard first as a demonstration to the Police and to the community that victims of the crime can participate in questioning the Police.

Why change the procedures. If Council members were limited to police officers or former police officers Thursday and Friday the line of questioning might be considerably different than if those surveilled were permitted to offer suggestions. It is obvious from the Police report dated March 7 that the police consider they have done no wrong, or if they have, Chiefs Wilson or Cullinane were certainly not involved. As citizens of D. C. we deserve a better answer. We need an opportunity now to provide the Council with questions to get those answers.

Why me? Newspaper reports identified a former D. C. police intelligence unit officer who admitted that the police had a particular interest in Julius and me and that we both were subject to non criminal police

surveillance. Why me--what necessitated this type of activity against me as a civilian? Was it because I supported the Equal Rights Amendment? The President's wife is the leading advocate of that amendment today. Was it because I associated with members of the Socialist Worker's Party(actually I never ask people for political affiliation)--when associating with my friends in the Republican Party may have been more damaging during those years? Was it because I supported reform of existing abortion laws? Most of those reforms have now been made. Was it because I worked for equal employment opportunity for women? Much has been accomplished since I was the first Director of the Federal Woman's Program 1967-69. Was it because Julius and I were considered to have "power" in the context of money and guns? We've never owned a gun and we've managed to cover our rent so that couldn't be the reason. Or, was I under surveillance because I married a black man of questionable political persuasion. Probably. Was this a crime?

Essential questions. Because other citizens have been denied the opportunity to present their problems and questions in advance of Police Department testimony, in behalf of these citizens, I ask the Council to ask each police officer the following questions:

1. Who was responsible for ordering surveillance activities?

2. Did the Police Department send records/files of non-criminal surveillance activity on any Federal/D. C. employee to any other agencies? (Civil Service Commission, FBI, CIA, etc.) For what reason?

3. If the above is true, has the D. C. government requested that such non criminal surveillance material be purged or withdrawn from employee records? This information could continue to injure opportunities for employee promotions, awards, etc.

4. Do you know of one instance where benefits of any kind were derived from the non criminal intelligence program?

5. To your knowledge, how much money was spent for investigating organized crime in comparison to funds spent on non criminal or political surveillance?

The Washington Post METRO

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1975 B1

Ex-Officer Infiltrated D.C. Women's Movement

POLICE, From B1

At the time of the surveillance, she said, she was trying to marshal support for a congressional bill that would provide women with equal rights.

Mrs. Hobson said no one was excluded from the liberation movement. "If they were Republicans, that was fine; if they were Socialists, that was fine, too," she said.

Hobson has said he was asked by the FBI to act as an informant at the 1964 Democratic National Convention. Hobson said he took the $200 the FBI offered but never reported anything or had any contact with the bureau during the Atlantic City, N.J., convention.

Binstead said he was told to tape record a speech to be given by Shriver, former U.S. ambassador to France, to find out if he made any "anti-administration comments."

Binsted said he trailed such antiwar leaders as Rennie Davis, Tom Hayden, Jane Fonda, Abbie Hoffman, and Jerry Rubin.

"When they were in town," he said, "(the police) wanted to know where they were staying and what they were doing."

Binsted said he often informed the police of potential violence based on information he obtained when he infiltrated the antiwar movement. On the bais of this, he said, the police should have been able to determine whether to keep officers working overtime.

Ex-Officer Tells of Infiltrating Women's Movement

By Ronald Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writer

A former D.C. police intelligence unit officer said this week he was assigned to investigate the women's liberation movement to determine if it was under the influence of Socialists.

Jim D. Binsted, who was detailed to the intelligence unit for four months in 1970, said he had his wife infiltrate local feminist groups and make reports that he dictated to the police.

The police had particular interest, Binsted said, in the activities and beliefs of Tina Hobson, who was a leader of the local liberation movement and was trying to get a bill passed by Congress to give equal rights to women.

Binsted said the police wanted to show that Mrs. Hobson was under Socialist influence to prove that her husband, Julius Hobson Sr., was a Socialist.

Julius Hobson was then a former D.C. school board member who was an antiwar and civil rights leader. He is now an at-large member of the D.C. City Council.

The assignment to probe women's liberation was one of a number that Binsted said he carried out as an undercover intelligence officer.

Binsted, 33, said he left the police department in 1972 after a four-year career because of dissatisfaction with what he said was a police policy of judging an officer's ability by the number of arrests he makes.

Some of Binsted's activities were reported by The Washington Post in 1973. In a recent interview in his Cabin John home, Binsted, now a private detective, revealed details of other surveillances he conducted while in the intelligence unit.

Binsted made the disclosures after The Post quoted an informed source this week as saying the intelligence unit kept files on the personal lives of antiwar activists and local politicans. The files, the source said, contained information on political beliefs, sexual activities, and drug use.

Assistant Police Chief Theodore R. Zanders subsequently confirmed that files were kept on political figures but denied they included information on drug use or sex activities. He later said the files, which have since been shredded, were on persons who later became politicians.

Zanders did not return telephone calls from a reporter yesterday. Other high police officials, informed of Binsted's allegations, had no comment.

Binsted said that while in the intelligence unit, he dressed in hippie clothes, carried no police identification, and recieved assignments and made reports only by mail or over a telephone number that was not part of the police exchange.



By Joe Heiberger—The Washington Post

Dorie and Jim Binsted at their Cabin John home, tell of undercover work.

Those who answered the telephone, he said, did not identify themselves. Binsted said he was told by his superiors that the information was being funneled along with data from other police and intelligence agencies to an undisclosed, central location.

At first, Binsted said, the police appeared to have a particular interest in what he called politicians and celebrities.

His first assignment, he said, was to monitor a talk by Sargent Shriver at a closed meeting of VISTA volunteers. Shriver was then chairman of a committee formed to help elect Democrats to Congress.

But Binsted said he raised objections to such activities and once asked his anonymous assigning officer if Binsted was supposed to be part of the Gestapo. "I was considered a renegade," he said.

As a result, he said, he was assigned to less controversial areas that included following antiwar leaders, infiltrating the women's liberation movement, and sitting in on classes at universities.

Binsted said he was never asked to report on sexual activities or drug use. However, he said he was told by other police personnel at the time that others in the intelligence unit were concentrating on reporting homosexual activities and drug use by those under surveillance.

Binsted said he made dozens of reports on the women's liberation movement. Although he attended some meetings where liberation leaders spoke, much of the material was provided by Binsted's wife, Dorie, he said.

Binsted was told his wife would be paid for her work, but she never was, he said.

Mrs. Binsted said she joined a women's group at George Washington University and found some of its leaders were also members of a Socialist group.

Referring to Mrs. Hobson, Binsted said, "They really wanted to get on her. They were trying to involve her in socialist groups to show that he was (a Socialist)."

"They really didn't like Hobson," Binsted added. "Whenever he was speaking publicly, they wanted us to be there. He was against the war, and he was pushing for black identity," he said.

Mrs. Binsted said her instructions were to find out "what she (Mrs. Hobson) says and who she hangs around with and what does she think."

Mrs. Binsted said she found that Mrs. Hobson wanted to improve women's jobs in the federal government if they had the required skills. She said Mrs Hobson also advocated more government aid to day care centers.

Mrs. Hobson, now a project manager in the Federal Energy Administration, said Friday she and her husband often joked about the possibility they were being watched by the government. But she said she never had any evidence of it.

See POLICE, B2, Col. 5

7/29

I would like to submit for the record my testimony dated 7/24/75 (which I tried to present last) I don't believe that I need take the Time of this Council to read -- I just want to add a list of facts and conclusions during the next few minutes

— ~~first~~ I would also like to make clear that. I am in no way challenging the interest in Civil Rights of this Council Committee -- nor their individual records. If there was ever a contest - I am sure I would come in last as I would with most people in this room. . . .

-- I assume eventual purpose of Committee
- establish standards / guidelines over police conduct in non criminal intelligence activities
- protect citizens (D.C. + nationwide) from police abuse in exercising rights under the 1st 4th + 14 amend. to the Constitution
- prevent continuing injury to citizens which could result from past intelligence activities. (D.C + nationwide)

-- I am confused as to why police first — including two responsible decision makers (Chief W + Col) with conveniently selective poor memories.

-- first establish credibility and intent of Committee toward citizens

of this city. In the eyes of many of us not one person sitting on the Council is Caesar's wife.

* -- Two members of this Committee, + several other elected officials tried to prevent me and hundreds of others from participating in a peaceful protest on June 22, 1972 "Ring around the capitol" -- a peace demonstration of women + children.

Will you try again to prevent me or other U.S. citizens from exercising our constitutional rights -- should you not like the color or rethoric of the group?

-- Therefore, in order to keep each other honest + objective it would have been wise for this Committee to hear citizens on the 1st day or at least interspersed citizens with police.

① • List of questions provided by committee to Council members inadequate
-- no reference to what is going on now. How much non-criminal info. being given to other State/cities/police Depts.?
-- how much info. given other fed. D.C. agencies - follow up to see if is withdrawn/destroyed? (By name only - or groups of files/pictures)

Provide questions for police - can't ask now

② Council should determine level of citizen concern.

Sizemore issue consuming public interest
City Image of permitting (encouraging) responsible public officials to make racist statements & condone racist actions.
In this area - we have a respon. to the community beyond D.C. Citizens -- nation wide -- come to visit & protest. (may have police folks)

Are we willing to represent citizens outside of D.C.

* Is your position that you want to prevent protest - as some of you did on June 22, 1972 -- particularly if the group is white or you disagree with the language of the protest?

NOT CLEAR

③ Council should be willing as an emergency to do something now to protect ~~continuing~~ citizens from the possibility of continuing abuse from past police activity.

Emergency Measures now

a. Request that the Mayor require Chief Cullaigne to personally authorize in writing any further exchange of non-criminal intelligence information with any other Gov. agency (fed. State or local) and or with any other police Dept.

b. Require Cullaigne' to contact any agency / police Dept. ~~which~~ which has received non-criminal information & request that such information be destroyed.

c. I would like to submit for the record two existing standards & procedures for police security activities of the intelligence Divisions of the LAPD and NYC PD

We have not taken the lead!

d. As with watergate — those decision makers at the top hold the real responsibility for police abuse of power — Wilson, Cullinane, the Mayor & the white house. These men should be held responsible — not the footsoldiers you are preoccupied with!

- Jerry Wilson

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- Mayor

our Police Chiefs

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• Mayor

our Police Chiefs

ANTI- RING AROUND THE CAPITOL

money to D.C. to protest
who initiated?

June 1972

COMMITTED NAMES

Gwen Patton, YWLL, Antioch, 1199
Curt James, YWLL, Antioch College
Herb Quinn, 1199
Bob Lindsay, Chairman, YWLL
Jackie Metzner, Angela Davis and Political Prisoners Defense Commission
Adellah
Maya Lindsay
Drake Beadle
Marilynn Jones
Pete Ward, Friendship House
Abe Lincoln, D. C. Young Democrats
Mary Treadwell Barry, Pride, Inc.
~~John Gibson~~
Audrey Colom
Herbert Barksdale, Founders Methodist Church
Taft Holland
Judy Howell
Alvin J. Brown
~~Honorable Walter Fauntroy~~ OK
Courtland Cox, Drum & Spear Bookstore
Frank Smith, Institute for Policy Studies
Reverend David Eaton, All Soul's Unitarian Church
T. C. Green, Rap, Inc.
Hilda H. Mason, Black Unitarian Caucus
Rosetta H. Isley, Mr. Man
Rosemary F. Crockett
Nadine Winter, Hospitality House
Edith Barksdale Sloan, National Committee for Household Employees
Reverend Joe Gipson, Nash Methodist Church
Josephine Heulett, N.C.H.E.
Anita Shelton, Christ Child Settlement House
Josephine Williams, N.W.R.O.
Ceci Matthews
Austine Boggis, Washington Urban League
James Speight, Southeast House
Reverend Edward Hailes, O.I.C., N.A.A.C.P.
Peggy Cooper, Esq.
Jim Gibson, Washington Planning Housing Association
Edell Lydea, Free Angela Committee
Major Lavel Merritt, Congress of African People
Marion S. Barry, Jr., D. C. Board of Education
Ed Nesbitt, Concerned Citizens for Central Cardoza
Charles W. Cheng, Teachers Union, Chinese Culture Center
Elizabeth Perry, N.W.R.O.
Bea Sines, S.C.L.C.
Geraldine Boykins
Charles Mahone, Washington Urban Coalition
Hosea Zollicoffer, Federal City College
Honorable Louise Stokes, Chairman, Black Congressional Caucus
Al Hillsman
Larry Blossingame
Mike Williams
Valerie Love
Marie Holland, D. C. Young Republicans
Musa Bey, Southeast Enrichment Center
Bill Sanders, Frederick Douglas Museum
Mr. Hanks, Howard University
Ron Clark, Rap, Inc.
Reverend Charles Pryor, Alexander Memorial Church
J. Warren Handel, Neighborhood Planning Council #5
Mary Harris, LeDroit Unity Club
Reginald Hart, Change Economic Development Corp
Joseph Watson, Columbia Heights Street Academy
Barbara Morgan, D. C. Democratic Central Committee Ward 7
Luther Marsh
Bill Lucy, A.F.M.C.E./A.F.L.C.I.O.
Linwood Chapman, Capitol East Community Organization
Jan Bailey
John Wilson, National Sharecropper Fund

ORGANIZATIONAL LISTING FOR IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES ONLY
PARTIAL LISTING

We, the black residents and the black workers in the Washington, D. C. community, have long since demonstrated our protest against the military-government of the U.S.A. in its attempts to bomb Southeast Asia into submission or face genocide and total annihalation. We have protested and continue to protest the atrocities this government is heaping on the people in Southeast Asia, as well as the atrocities perpetrated against us by the same government in the Capitol of the United States. We know first hand what a puppet government can do to crush positive action and demands for self-determination. The people of Washington, D.C. and people of Indo-China are each involved in a struggle for self-determination. Oppressed peoples of the world have a common goal--the right to determine our own destinies for decent, human survival. We hold mutual respect for all brothers and sisters who are in tense struggles to make human right a reality, for we know that, after Southeast Asia, the military might of the U.S.A. will focus on another non-white nation, i.e., Africa, The Carribean, China, Latin America. We clearly understand that the oppressor abroad is the oppressor in this country and the oppressor of our city.

Dr. Martin Luther King in 1966 spoke directly to Peace as the fundamental issue and its effects on blacks, other national minorities and poor people. Dr. King's beliefs were not those of an international black figure seeking self-acclaim; but was the voice of black and poor America pouring out its frustrations and disgust of this country's immorality.

The response from the white community was harsh in its attack and firm in its insistence that Dr. King "stays in his place". At Riverside Church in April 1967, Dr. King reaffirmed that it is not in the interest of black and poor Americans to continue to be used as cannon fodder domestically nor internationally.

In 1972, there is no question why white America reacted so violently against this voice, for immorality has become the base from which the organized Peace Movement has grown.

It is insane that the organizing forces against the war have demanded that black people become involved in actions which do not help and speak to our own freedom in this country. It is they who have decreed that the only unjust killings are in Southeast Asia; the only unjust war is in Southeast Asia; and the only unjust oppression is in Southeast Asia.

It is alone that we, as one of America's minorities, face our daily killings, our daily wars, and our daily oppression.

We, therefore, condemn the myopic attitudes and actions of racism within the so-called Peace Movement in America. Since 1976? the insentivity of the Peace Movement to interrelate domestic issues with foreign affairs has demonstrated their refusal to face the totality of the problem. To support our charge of racism we raise these indictments:

Racism in the Peace Movement

- The cost for demonstrations is paid out of the local D. C. budget which comes from the taxes of D.C. workers. These taxes are used to beef up the Police Department in lieu of monies used for education, health, nutrition and employment services for D. C. residents.
- Refusal to interrelate Southeast Asia's right for self-determination and black people's right for self-determination in D.C., Africa, and other oppressed countries.
- No substantial backing of black political candidates to include those who back acts of non-aggression.
- Refusal to deal with self-racism and recognizing their own chauvinist, racist nature.
- Refusal to do grass-roots organizing around the war so that the people can see the relationship of war, the wage freeze, inflation and black people's day-to-day survival.
- Allowing a leisure-class leadership who dictates to the working class of this country without involving the working class in the decision-making process.
- Refusal to help and recognize black POW's and their families.
- No recognition of the heartless treatment families of black casualties face, i.e., the struggle to bury a black soldier in Wetumpka, Alabama when all "Negro" plots had been filled.
- Overlooking institutionalized racism that minority soldiers face in each branch of the armed forces here and abroad.
- Using the Peace Movement as a vehicle for temper tantrums, to get stardom, to satisfy ego trips and tax deductions.
- To include blacks and other minorities on a token basis, using them only as a drawing card to legitimize the racist goals of the existing Peace Movement.

The Refusal to Recognize that the War in Vietnam is Racist in Nature

- Vietnam veterans are returning as drug addicts to increase the dilemma of drug addiction, especially in the black community.
- Veterans, especially blacks, are unable to find jobs and thus join the unemployment ranks after fighting an insane war in Vietnam.
- Some veterans, especially black men, are placed in the police department and other military and government jobs which repress the local black communities, like methadone maintenance programs which develop a vested business interest in drug racketeering.
- The draft and its relation to the removal of black men out of our families and into jails and welfare systems.
- Monies spent for an insane war instead of rebuilding black communities.
- The profitability of wars to corporate America.
- The increase of repressive acts by the U.S. government and the making of political prisoners of those who speak out against the war and other issues.
- Refusal to set a date to end the war now! And actions leading up to that date.

These indictments are at the core of the problem between black people and the so-called Peace Movement. Not to recognize these indictments is blatant racism. Not to deal with those problems only widens the gap between black and white in this country, the Third World and white the world over.

To close the gap, to deal with the core of the problem, we, the black residents and workers, propose the following positive alternate to the "Ring Around the Capitol":

A Summit Conference on June 22 in Washington, D. C. The intent of the Summit is to iron out problems, to make the Peace Movement a People's Movement for Positive Social Change which can have international consequences. We intend to have:

- A broad base of community groups and people will draw up guidelines for those national demonstrations which want access to black community resources and participation of black people.

- A meeting which allows D.C. residents and workers, national black leaders and white peace leaders to come together to adopt an agreed plan of action.

We see this as a positive and concrete way to sincerely deal with the problems that beset the rights of oppressed peoples to the right of self-determination.

D. C. is not the nation's picnic ground. The "ring around the rosy" mentality which calls for the June 22 demonstration must be stopped.